The control structure over money and real assets is considered in the process of cost innovation. The work here contrasts with the …rst part of this paper where the emphasis was on the physical aspects of innovation. Here the emphasis is primarily on the money supply aspects of innovation. We conclude with observations on evaluation and the locus of control in the process of innovation.
Contents
past twenty to thirty years there have been considerable writing and empirical work on innovation and the economic and behavioral questions it raises, see for example Arthur [2] , Dosi et al. [8] , Bechtel et al. [5] , Baumol [4] , Lamoreaux and Sololo¤ [10] , Day [6] , Eliasson and Wihlborg [7] , Nelson [11] , Nelson and Winter [12] , Shubik [13] and in particular the essay of Day. The work here is aimed at being complementary with these but aimed speci…-cally at trying to characterize mathematically via a dynamic programming formulation of strategic market games the monetary aspects of innovation eventually including ownership, …nancial control, and coordination features of a market economy.
Physical and …nancial assets, innovation and equilibrium?
This paper is addressed speci…cally to cost innovation and the breaking of the circular ‡ow of funds. It considers some of the problems of the interaction between ownership and control. Although written to stand alone, it is based directly on two essays, one dealing with equilibrium in a closed monetary economy without innovation [9] and the other concerned with the physical good aspects of innovation in a Robinson Crusoe Economy [14] . In Section 3 the basic structure of the monetary economy and its dynamic equilibria are noted. In particular the role of the money interest rate as a control variable emerges in this setting. The earlier paper [14] is more or less a straightforward exercise in operations research where in a non-market, non-monetary setting Robinson Crusoe has to evaluate how to give up physical assets needed for use in a risky innovation. In our deconstruction of the investment decision there are …ve features that merit individual analysis; they are:
1. Equilibrium in a closed monetary economy prior to the knowledge that innovation is feasible;
2. Innovation in a Robinson Crusoe setting, involving only physical assets;
3. Innovation in a closed monetary economy with only short term assets investigating the need for the expansion of money and credit;
4. The roles of long term capital assets, locus of control, evaluation and funding for innovation; and 5. The implications of continuing innovation for the distribution of …rm size and investment.
As has been noted above the …rst two topics have been dealt with in separate essays. We limit our analysis here to the third item in order to make explicit the monetary ‡ows and their control. We comment on the last two features of innovation in Sections 6 and 7, in the expectation that we and others will deal with these central aspects of control and valuation in a competitive innovating economy.
One of our goals is to provide some su¢ ciently tractable examples that can serve as a basis for experimental games.
Open and Closed Monetary Economies with Di¤erent Agents
Prior to constructing a fully closed model, an open model of competitive innovation is speci…ed. For simplicity we keep the random component of the innovation process to a minimum. All individuals have an opportunity to innovate in the …rst period. Each individual's success depends on the size of her investment in innovation. After the …rst period there is no further opportunity to innovate.
A preliminary open economy model
A formal model of a large group of competitive …rms in a partial equilibrium monetary economy with innovation is considered. After observations on this we turn to the basic structure of ownership and …nancial control in a closed monetary economy.
An open competitive economy with innovating individual agents
In our earlier essay [14] we studied Robinson Crusoe as an isolated single innovator with no …nancial or market system existing. We then considered the market analogue of a small individual, so small that he does not in ‡uence market input or output prices even if he innovates. In a monetary economy (unlike that of Crusoe) the …rm can buy the desired inputs needed for innovation or production rather than have them in inventory. Furthermore, in general it does not produce for self-consumption, but for sales. This is tantamount to saying that the even the owner-controlled …rm may maximize some function of expected pro…ts. In this model we assume for simplicity that the input good for production is the same as the output good, and therefore has the same price. (Another interesting, but quite di¤erent model, would assume the input good to be di¤erent from the output good). Consider a continuum of small …rms 2 [0; 1] willing to innovate and consider that their actions as a whole in ‡uence market price. In each of a countable number of periods n = 1; 2; : : : each …rm begins with a quantity q n of goods to be sold in a market. The total amount of goods for sale in period n is
We assume that there is a demand function ( ) so that the price of the goods in period n is
The introduction of a demand function for the price of the produced good allows us to avoid modeling the consumers and owners, and the circular cash ‡ows. However, the modeling of these features will be important in the closed models of later sections. At the start of each period n each …rm holds an amount 0 of cash and has as goods-in-process q n : The goods are sold in the market at the start of the period at the price p n = (Q n ): Each …rm borrows an amount b n at the …xed interest rate 0 from a central bank to …nance production. The loan b n enables the …rm to buy an amount of input i n = b n =p n . The loan is short-term and must be paid back with interest at the end of the period.
All …rms begin in period 1 with the same production function f 1 : [0; 1) 7 ! [0; 1), which is assumed to be concave, increasing, and to satisfy f 1 (0) = 0. An input i n by a …rm at period n with production function f 1 results in the production of goods q n+1 = f 1 (i n ) to be sold in the following period.
If a …rm wishes to innovate it must seek out a long-term loan c to purchase an amount of input goods j = c =p n to use in innovation. The …rm must service the long-term loan at c per period where is the longterm rate of interest. The servicing of the long-term loan is deducted from pro…ts in each period. In the models of this paper, it is assumed that the decision to innovate is made at the beginning of period 1 and that there is no opportunity to innovate at later stages of the game. (In Part 3 we will consider models which allow for repeated attempts at innovation.)
A successful innovation attempt results in an improved production function f 2 : [0; 1) 7 ! [0; 1) with the same properties as f 1 and such that f 2 (i) f 1 (i) for all inputs i 0 and with strict inequality holding for some values of i. The probability of a successful innovation is an increasing function (j) of the amount j of goods invested. The probability of failure is 1 (j) and, if failure occurs in the attempt, the …rm must operate thereafter with the original production function f 1 .
The (net) pro…t n of …rm in period n is the income from its sales in the period minus its interest payments:
The objective of the …rm is to maximize the expected value of its total discounted pro…ts, namely
There are limits on the size of both the short-term and the long-term loans obtained by a …rm . There is a …xed bound E 0 on the size of the longterm loan c . The limit on the short-term loan b n is set at (p n q n c )=(1+ ) in order to assure that the …rm is able to pay its debts and avoid bankruptcy.
In seeking a type symmetric equilibrium for this economy, we assume that all …rms begin in period 1 with the same quantity q > 0 of goods-inprocess, make the same bid b for input goods for production, and invest the same amount c in attempting to innovate. At the beginning of period 2, there will be two types of …rms, those called type 1 which have failed in the attempt and must continue with the production function f 1 and those called type 2 which have succeeded and henceforth have the improved production function f 2 . There will be a fraction " = (c=p 1 ) of …rms of type 2 and " = 1 " = 1 (c=p 1 ) of type 1 in all future periods. In order to obtain a Bellman equation for the value of this game to a …rm, we will …rst consider the values for the two types in a period n 2 and then reason by backward induction to get the equation starting at the beginning.
So suppose that at the beginning of some period after the …rst, type 1 …rms each have goods q 1 and type 2 …rms have goods q 2 . The total quantity of goods for sale is then
at the price p = (Q). The Bellman equation for a …rm of type k can be written, for k = 1; 2, as
is the quantity of goods held by the …rm in the next period andp is the price of goods in the next period. ThusQ = "q 1 + "q 2 is the quantity of goods for sale in the next period andp = (Q).
The cost c to each …rm for its long-term loan is the same in every period. So, if we set W k (q k ; p) = W k (q k ; p; 0), it is easy to see that
and also that
Now let W (q; p) be the value function for a …rm starting in period 1 and facing the decision about how much to invest in innovation as well as in production. Then the Bellman equation is given by
where p is the price of goods in period 1,q = f 1 (b=p) is the amount of goods held by the …rm at the beginning of period 2 andp is the price of goods in period 2. In a type-symmetric equilibrium, all …rms will begin period 2 with the sameq. ThusQ =q is also the total quantity of goods, andp = (Q)
. For the open model of this section we do not describe consumer behavior beyond the implicit behavior given in the demand function. Furthermore we are not concerned with closure on the monetary ‡ows that are required of a closed model. These are addressed in Sections 5 and 6. Here the dividends that the …rm pays out disappear into a black box, as do the earnings of the central bank.
Convergence to stationary equilibrium after innovation
By a stationary equilibrium is meant a Nash equilibrium in which bids, prices and the quantity of goods produced remain constant. After the initial shock of innovation in the …rst period, the economy in our model always has a …xed fraction " of …rms with production function f 1 and the remaining fraction " with production function f 2 . All …rms have the same long-term debt of c 0, which requires a payment of c in every period. Under some additional assumptions, there is for such an economy a unique stationary equilibrium. It is rarely the case that the economy is in stationary equilibrium immediately or even soon after the innovation stage, but there is, in some generality, convergence to stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches in…nity.
In this section we assume that the production functions are strictly concave, continuously di¤erentiable, and that for k = 1; 2
We also assume that the demand function is continuous, decreasing with …nite positive values, and that prices approach 1 or 0 as the quantity of goods approaches 0 or 1 respectively; that is,
Finally, we also now allow for the possibility that the pro…t of a …rm may be negative in some periods. This means that the bid b k of a …rm may exceed the limit (pq k c)=(1 + ) in some periods. Consider the Bellman equation (8) above and, for k = 1; 2, let
is the expression inside the supremum in (8) . Standard arguments show that
Consequently the Euler equations take the form
This holds if and only if
In stationary equilibrium there will be a …xed price p for goods so that p =p = p and f
The input of type k …rms is
The total quantity of goods is then Q = "q 1 + "q 2 and p = (Q ).
Theorem 1 There is a unique stationary equilibrium with the constant price p and the constant quantity Q of goods produced. In every period, …rms of type k, for k = 1; 2, bid b k = p i k , and produce q k .
Proof. The bids b k are the unique solutions to the Euler equations, and an appropriate transversality condition is trivial because quantities and prices are constant by stationarity.
Suppose now that the economy begins in period 1 with the fraction " of …rms of type 1 each holding the quantity q 1 > 0 of goods and the fraction " of …rms holding the quantity q 2 > 0 of goods. So the initial quantity of goods in the economy is Q = "q 1 + "q 2 and the initial price is p = (Q).
Theorem 2 If, in every period, every …rm chooses its bids so that the Euler equation (12) is satis…ed, then, as the number of periods approaches in…nity, the total quantity of goods will approach Q , the price will approach p , and the bids of type k …rms will approach q k for k = 1; 2.
More brie ‡y, the economy converges to its stationary equilibrium as the number of periods converges to in…nity. The proof is in an appendix.
A simple example for pro…t maximizing …rms
In general, an analytic solution to the innovation model is not possible. This is, in part, because the innovation stage forces the economy out of stationary equilibrium. By Theorem 2 the economy will, under reasonable assumptions, converge to a new stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches in…nity. In this section we consider a very simple example for which the convergence takes only one step and an analytic solution is easy. 
The total quantity of goods is
The price of output is given by the demand function
So the initial price is p = 5 2 = 3. Consider …rst the situation where there is no possibility of innovation. It is then easy to see that the optimal bid of every …rm for input goods is b = 3, and each …rm then produces
and earns the pro…t = pq (1 + )b = 3 2 (1:05) 3 = 2:85:
Indeed, total goods remain equal to 2 and the price of goods is again 3. The economy is in stationary equilibrium. Each …rm earns the same pro…t in every period and receives a total discounted pro…t of 
Now suppose that there is the possibility of innovation at stage 1. Assume that a successful attempt at innovation results in the improved production function
Note that the maximum production level remains 2, but e¢ ciency is increased so that this maximum is attained with an input of 1=2 rather than 1.
Assume that the …rms can obtain long-term loans at interest rate = : 05 in order to purchase goods to be used in the innovation process. Further assume that if c units of money are borrowed in order to obtain j = c=p = c=3 units of the input good, then the probability of a successful innovation is
In order to …nd the optimal choice for c, we will …rst calculate, as a function of c, the value of the game from stage 2 onwards for both the successful and the unsuccessful …rms. Then we can use backward induction to …nd the optimal value of c at stage 1.
Even with the possibility of innovation, it remains true that the optimal bid for goods to input for production is b = p = 3. Thus every …rm begins stage 2 with goods q = f 1 (b=p) = f 1 (1) = 2. Total goods for sale are Q = 2 with price p = (Q) = 3.
However, the fraction c=(c + 3) of the …rms are successful and begin stage 2 with the improved production function f 2 , while the remaining fraction 3=(c + 3) are unsuccessful and still have the production function f 1 . Call the unsuccessful …rms type 1. These …rms continue to have the optimal bid b 1 = 3 with output f 1 (1) = 2. All …rms have the same long-term debt of c. So the pro…t of type 1 …rms at stage 2 is
The successful …rms, called type 2, have the optimal bid b 2 = 3=2 with output f 2 (b 2 =p) = f 2 (1=2) = 2 and pro…t for type 1, and
for type 2. Now we can calculate the value W (2) to a …rm from the beginning stage when all …rms start at q = 2: This value is
where
Take p = 3; q = 2; = = :05; b = 3 and the values calculated above for Now 74:46 > 59:85 so that overall expected pro…ts have increased due to innovation. However, the unsuccessful …rms would have been better o¤ had they not tried to innovate. Indeed the total discounted pro…t of a type 2 …rm is just the same as in (14) minus the cost 1:05c of …nancing the attempt.
A comment on open models
When studying a few …rms or a single industry to answer questions such as the distribution of …rm size, the need to consider the full feedbacks from a closed economy is for most purposes both unnecessary and more di¢ cult than partial equilibrium analysis. However in order to appreciate the macroeconomic aspects of the in ‡uence of …nancial control and the money supply it is necessary to consider a closed economy. It is there that the separation among ownership, management and …nancing …rst appears with clarity and the meaning of the breaking of the equilibrium circular ‡ow of capital may be illustrated.
The Closed Economy as a Sensing, Evaluating and Control Mechanism
Prior to considering the formal closed models with innovation, several general items that supply context are covered. A detailed sketch of the whole closed system is presented in Figure 1 ; it is somewhat simpli…ed in Figure  2 prior to the formal analysis. Figure 1 shows di¤erentiated economic units with some enforcement and evaluation included. Figure 1 1 provides an overall description describing how credit evaluation, clearing houses, the banks, central bank and courts …t into the information and enforcement structure. Institutional reality has many variations and it is easy to argue with the particular "wiring"presented here. but the purpose of this diagram is to give a …ngerspitzengefühl or an intuitive feeling of what the many realities look like. Unlike Figure 2 , three additional institutions appear. They are the clearinghouse, the credit evaluation agency (implicitly including the accountants) and the court house. In much of economic theory expertise is ignored primarily because it is too hard to deal with. In old fashioned securities analysis and accounting due diligence and expertise is central to applications, but it is often ignored in much of economic and …nance theory. This is because it is subsumed in modeling the risky economic instruments and entities being dealt with as lottery tickets that have already been correctly evaluated. We follow this extreme approximation because for our prime purpose, which is consideration of the breaking of the circular ‡ow of capital, even at this level of abstraction the phenomenon still occurs. 
Individual or representative agents?
When there is no uncertainty, models utilizing representative agents and models with independent agents solved for type-symmetric noncooperative equilibria (TSNE) give the same equilibrium results. When there is any exogenous uncertainty present this is no longer generally true. With independent agents uncertainty is not necessarily correlated. However, with a representative agent, uncertainty is implicitly correlated for all members of the class. As is indicated below we consider a minimal amount of uncertainty.
On money, credit, banks, and central banks
In institutional fact the de…nition and measurement of the money supply is di¢ cult at best. The distinctions between money and credit are not always clear. Here we utilize a ruthless simpli…cation in order to highlight the distinction between money and credit and to be able to stress economic control. Consider money to be paper gold, or some form of blue chip in which payments are made. Credit is a contract between two entities A and B, in which individual A delivers money at time t 1 in return for an IOU or a promise from B to repay an amount of money to A at time t 2 : An individual may be a natural person or a legal person such as a …rm, a bill broker, a bank, a credit granting clearing house or a central bank.
We may consider two ways to vary the money supply. The …rst and simpler is that the central bank is permitted to print it. Another way to vary the money supply is to accept the IOU notes of commercial banks as money. Say they are red chips, in contrast with the central bank's blue chips. They are accepted in payment on a 1 : 1 basis with blue chips. A reserve ratio controls the amount a bank can issue, thus for any k units of red chips issued, a bank must hold one unit of blue chips. 2 As we wish to maintain as high a level of simpli…cation as possible in order to illustrate the breaking of the circular ‡ow, we select the simpler structure. The banking system is considered as one and called the central bank. It has funds above its reserves 3 that it can lend and it can pay interest on deposits. 4 
The Separation of Management and Ownership
The next level of complexity above the single type of agent utilizes two types of agents: managers of the …rms and stockholder-owners. (In the …rst model 2 The justi…cation for the acceptance of reserve ratio banking is in the dynamics along with acceptance of …at (see for example, [3] ). 3 Central bank reserves in a …at money economy are a creation of law and possibly economic theology. Mathematically they are just societal rules of the game or an algorithm stating how the central bank can create money. They specify its strategy set. In actuality the strategy set is also bounded by political pressures. 4 In general, central banks do not accept deposits from natural persons, but for modeling simplicity here we permit them to do so. below, there is also a class of saver agents who subsist on the returns from their bank deposits.) The economy can be interpreted as a fully de…ned game of strategy where there is a …nite measure of …rms and of stockholderowners whose overall actions will in ‡uence prices. By assuming that we limit the solution to a type symmetric noncooperative equilibrium, all agents of each type, even though independent, will employ a strategy common to their type. In illustrating some of the basic aspects of …nancing and control of innovation, the independent agent models show microeconomic uncertainty at the innovation stage.
A Closed Economy Prior to Innovation: The Circular Flow of Money Illustrated
The model presented in this section is based on work of Karatzas et al. [9] without innovation. It will be extended in the next section to a model with innovation in order to consider the disequilibrium aspects of innovation on the money supply. Out stress so far has been on non-monetary models of Crusoe as an innovator, or on open microeconomic models. From here on the emphasis is on simple closed economies or macroeconomic models.
A closed economy with producers, consumers, monied individuals and a central bank
The underlying model is that of a "cash-in-advance" market economy with a continuum of …rms 2 J = [0; 1] that produce goods all of which must be put up for sale, and a continuum of stockholder agents 2 I = [0; 1] who own the …rms and purchase these goods for consumption. The agents hold cash and bid for goods in each of a countable number of periods n = 1; 2; : : :. The …rms hold no cash 5 and must borrow from a single outside bank to purchase goods as input for production in every period. The bank is modeled as a strategic dummy that accepts deposits and o¤ers loans at a …xed interest rate . In addition to the owner agents, there may be a continuum of saver agents 2 K = [0; 1], each of whom holds cash, bids in every period to buy goods for consumption, and subsists entirely on her savings. These agents can be thought of as "retirees" or private capitalists.
6 Figure 2 shows the structure of the economy with …rms, owners, savers and a central bank. The six boxes portray an economy somewhat more complex than our mathematics deals with, but give an intuitive insight into the spreading out of ownership and control in a modern enterprise economy. The …rms are in general corporate, they do not own themselves. They have (at some ultimate level) natural person stockholders who are also consumers. Directly or indirectly they depend on at least four sets of decisionmakers for debt (and some equity or options) …nancing. They are the passive savers, the …nanciers, the commercial banks and the central bank. Without having to elaborate further it should be evident that in any dynamic setting the coordination problem is considerable. In the mathematical model below we grossly simplify the …nancial sector, ignoring the …nanciers, collapsing the commercial banks and central bank into one and having the passive savers save in the aggregate bank, while the …rms borrow only from this bank.
The situation of the …rms in this model is similar to that of the …rms in the open model of Section 2. However, the …rms in this …rst closed model have no opportunity to innovate and carry no long-term debt. Each …rm begins every period n with goods q n that are to be sold in the market. The total amount of goods o¤ered for sale is de…ned as in equation (1) by
Each …rm also borrows cash b n from a central bank, with 0 b n (p n q n )=(1 + ) , where p n is the price of the good in period n and > 0 is the interest rate. There is no demand function in this model and the prices are formed endogenously as will be explained below.
The …rm spends the cash b n to purchase the amount of goods i n = b n =p n as input for production, and begins the next period with an amount of goods
Here f ( ) is a production function, which satis…es the usual assumptions. During period n each …rm earns the (net) pro…t n = p n q n (1 + )b n ; since it must pay back its loan with interest. The goal of the …rm is to maximize its total discounted pro…ts
In a given period n, the total pro…ts generated by all the …rms, are
The pro…ts n are distributed to the owner agents in equal shares at the end of the period.
The owner agents are now considered. A typical owner agent holds money m n at the beginning of each period n. The agent bids an amount of money a n with 0 a n m n + n =(1 + ), which buys him an amount x n = a n =p n of goods for immediate consumption. Any extra money an owner agent has is deposited and earns interest at rate . The agent begins the next period with cash m n+1 = (1 + ) (m n a n ) + n :
Each agent seeks to maximize his total discounted utility
where u is a concave increasing utility function and 0 < < 1 is a given discount factor. Also considered is a typical saver agent , who holds m n in cash at the start of period n. The saver bids an amount c n of cash with 0 c n m n , which buys him a quantity y n = c n =p n of goods, and starts the next period with
in cash. If v( ) is his utility function, with the same properties as u( ), the saver agent's objective is to maximize the total discounted utility
The total amounts of money bid in period n by the owner agents, the …rms, and the saver agents, are
respectively. The price p n is formed as the total bid over the total production
An equilibrium is constructed as follows. Suppose that all owner agents begin with cash M Suppose that the bids of the agents and …rms are
that is, proportional to the total amount of cash, so that the price is also proportional to this amount:
Then the pro…t of each …rm is
the cash of each owner agent at the beginning of the next period is
and the cash held by each saver agent is
Thus, the total amount of cash held by all agents at the beginning of the next period is
where we have set = 1 + (a + b + c):
The following theorem was established in [9] .
Theorem 3 Suppose that there exists i with f 0 (i ) = (1+ )= . Then there is an equilibrium for which, in every period: each …rm inputs i , produces q = f (i ), and bids the amount b n = b M n ; each owner agent bids a n = a M n ; and each saver agent bids c n = c M n . Here
and M n = M A n + M n is the amount of cash held across agents in period n. Furthermore, in each period n: every owner agent consumes the amount x = (1 1+ )q i ; every saver agent consumes the amount y = ( 1+ )q ; whereas every …rm makes M n in pro…ts, with
It is shown in [9] that, in the equilibrium of Theorem 3, the consumption and total discounted utility of the owner agents are decreasing functions of , such agents prefer as low an interest rate as possible. Similarly, the …rms also prefer an interest rate as close to zero as possible, in order to maximize their pro…ts. But the situation of the saver agents is subtler: under certain con…gurations of the various parameters of the model (discount factor, production function, utility function) they prefer as high an interest rate as possible, whereas under other con…gurations they settle on an interest rate 2 (0; 1) that uniquely maximizes their welfare. Let
Then money and prices in ‡ate (or de ‡ate) at rate in the equilibrium of Theorem 3. We also have a + b + c = r, so that the Fisher equation = (1 + ) holds.
Remark 1 By setting = 0 in Theorem 3, we obtain an economy with only producer …rms and owner-consumer agents. 8 We will similarly dispense with saver agents in the models below. This will be useful in illustrating the basic problems with the circular ‡ow and money supply with innovation in a simple context. Also we will take = (1 + ) = 1 so that there is no in ‡ation.
Innovation in an Asset Poor Economy: Breaking the Circular Flow
As in the previous models we aggregate all goods in the model of this section into a single perishable consumable that is utilized in consumption or production or consumed in innovation. There is no capital stock, such as steel mills. There is no "fat"in the economy, resources for innovation must come directly out of consumption resources.
The meaning of an asset poor economy
In actuality a modern economy is rich in real durable assets with a time pro…le of durables of many ages that are consumed only in production, not consumption. Gross Domestic Product may be split into consumption and investment. If we consider around 70% in consumption, then we note that at market prices the value of real assets such as steel mills, automobile factories, houses, automobiles, machinery, land and other consumer durables are priced probably between 5 to 10 times the value of consumption. None of these items are meaningfully placed directly in the utility functions of the individuals. Furthermore, it is the services of consumer durables that are ultimately valued and not the durables themselves. This is even truer of items such as steel mills. In the models considered so far we have not indicated that the presence of this large mass of assets owned by individuals may be such that the loss or exchange of a small percentage of these assets while pursuing innovation will hardly change the consumption of the owners of large amounts of real assets. In a poor country the amount of available assets relative to consumption will be much smaller than in a rich one. We consider in this section the extreme simplifying case where innovation must come directly out of consumption. This makes it easier to be speci…c about the breaking of the circular ‡ow of capital and the match between real assets and money.
In essence innovation is nothing other than the execution of an idea for a new process to rearrange and employ existing assets in a di¤erent manner. 9 It is a breaking of equilibrium that in a rich country calls for an alternative use for productive assets but does not directly cut down heavily on current consumption. In contrast, in an asset poor economy, an immediate sacri…ce in consumption is called for.
Innovation in an asset poor economy
We consider a model with a class of identical manufacturers, a class of identical, individual consumers, who also own the …rms, and an outside or central bank.
One could consider three variants:
1. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central bank is willing to create new money to make investment loans.
2. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central bank does not create new money. It is a ‡ow-through institution 3. The stockholders are in control, they dictate corporate policy, thus the …rms are operationally utility maximizing rather than pro…t maximizing. There are at least two possibilities here that need to be distinguished (a) the central bank is willing to create new money and the stockholders cannot create their own credit; and (b) the central bank is unwilling to create new money and the stockholders can create their own credit.
All three variants are found in a modern economy. The third is the most representative of …ghts for oligopolistic control of the …rms by individual stockholders (in partnership or corporate structure) holding large blocks of stock, while the remaining stockholders are passive, riding coattails or selling. We do not construct a mathematical model of this case here. The …rst model serves adequately to illustrate the problems with …nancing and is now described in detail.
A model with managerial control and central bank lending
As in the model of Section 5.1, there is a continuum of …rms 2 J = [0; 1]. Each …rm begins each period n with goods in process q n to be sold in the market, and borrows cash b n from the central bank to purchase goods i n = b n =p n as input for production. Each …rm begins in period 1 with no long term debt, but may borrow an amount of money c from the bank to purchase goods j = c =p 1 to be used in innovation. The interest on this long term debt must be paid in every period and the short term loan b n must be paid back with interest at the end of each period n. In general, the long term rate might di¤er from the short term rate, but it is su¢ cient and simpler to assume that they are equal to a common value 0. In order that a …rm be able to meet its debt obligations, the bid b n is restricted to lie in the interval [0; (p n q n c )=(1 + )], wherep n is the bank's estimate of the price p n in period n. (In a rational expectations equilibrium,p n = p n .) The bank may also impose an upper limit E on the long term loan c .
As in the model of Section 2.2, all …rms begin in period 1 with the same production function f 1 and thus a …rm will begin period 2 with goods q 2 = f 1 (i 1 ). However, a successful innovation results in the improved production function f 2 . Thus in periods after the …rst, there are two types of …rms -those of type 1, that failed in the attempt at innovation, and continue with production function f 1 , and the type 2 …rms, that succeeded, and have f 2 .
The pro…t n of a …rm in period n is de…ned by formula (3) in Section 2.2, and each …rm seeks to maximize its total discounted pro…ts (4). The total pro…t in period n of all the …rms is the integral
and is paid to the consumer-owners in equal shares at the end of the period, as is explained below.
Because we will again look for a type symmetric equilibrium, we will assume that all …rms begin period 1 with the same quantity q 1 > 0 of goods, and we will often omit the superscript below. When all …rms begin in the same state, make the same bids b 1 and c, and earn the same pro…t
c, the total pro…t and total goods in period 1 simplify to
Suppose W is the overall value of the program to a …rm. W 1 is the value after a failed investment, and W 2 is the value after a successful investment. Let (c=p 1 ) = (j) be the probability of success when c=p 1 = j is invested in innovation. Then the value functions satisfy the following optimality equations.
for k = 1; 2: For simplicity we have suppressed super and subscripts above and will often do so below as well. In both (19) and (20) the notationp is for the bank's estimate of the price for goods in the period, whereas p denotes the price actually formed as will be explained below.
As in Section 2.2 there will be after the …rst period the fraction " = (c=p) of type 2 …rms that succeeded at innovation and the fraction " = 1 " of type 1 …rms that failed.
In seeking a type symmetric solution, we will assume that at the beginning of periods n 2 all …rms of type 1(respectively type 2) will hold the same quantity of goods q 1 n (respectively q 2 n ) and earn the same pro…t 1 n (respectively 2 n ) in the period. Thus the total pro…t and totals goods in period n are given by
n : In addition to the …rms there is also a continuum of consumer-stockholder agents 2 I = [0; 1]: As in the model of Section 5.1 each agent begins every period n with cash m n and bids a n 2 [0; m n ] to purchase goods a n =p n for immediate consumption. The agent deposits the excess cash m n a n in the bank and gets back (1 + )(m n a n ) at the end of the period.
The accounting pro…t D n of the bank in period n consists of its earnings from the loans made to the …rms less the interest paid on the deposits of the owners. Thus
For this model we assume that the pro…t of the bank, like that of the …rms, is paid to the owners in equal shares at the end of the period. (This assumption and a possible alternative are discussed in Section 6.2.3 below.) Thus an owner agent begins period n + 1 with cash
The value function V for an owner satis…es
where u is a concave, nondecreasing utility function and we have again suppressed super and subscripts. The price p n in each period n is formed as the ratio of the total cash bid in the goods market to the total amount of goods for sale. In the type symmetric case, the prices are given by
If m 1 = m, then by (22)
Now p 1 q 1 = a 1 + b 1 + c. Substitute this into the previous equation and simplify the result to see that m 2 = m + c: A similar calculation shows that m n = m + c for all n 2. Thus in this model the money supply has an initial increase because of the long-term loan in the …rst period and then remains constant.
Stationary equilibrium and the question of convergence
A stationary equilibrium for the economy of the previous section is an equilibrium in which bids, prices, and the quantities of goods and money remain constant. The economy experiences a shock due to innovation in the …rst period after which there is always a …xed fraction " of type 1 …rms and " of type 2 …rms. We cannot expect to have a stationary equilibrium until sometime after the …rst period. Under some additional regularity assumptions, there does exist a type symmetric stationary equilibrium for the economy as it is con…gured after the initial shock. Assume now that the production functions f 1 ; f 2 and the utility function u are strictly concave, continuously di¤erentiable, and that the production functions satisfy the condition (11) of Section 2.2.1.
Suppose as above that there is a fraction " of type 1 …rms having production function f 1 and holding goods q 1 , a fraction " of type 2 …rms having production function f 2 and holding goods q 2 , and a continuum of consumerowner agents 2 [0; 1] each with cash m. The argument in Section 2.2.1 using Euler equations works here as well to show that in stationary equilibrium each type k …rm will input the quantity
The Euler equation for a consumer-owner takes the form
where (1 + ) = 1 by assumption, andã andp are the agent's bid and the price in the next period. But in stationary equilibrium a =ã and p =p. So the only condition on the optimal bid a is that 0 a m. Let Q = "q 1 + "q 2 be the total production when …rms of type k input i k for k = 1; 2. Now in order to purchase i k , …rms of type k must bid b k = pi k . Thus the price must satisfy
or equivalently
which means that the owner agents consume all the goods produced by the …rms that are not used by the …rms as input for production of goods for the next period. Let p = m=Q so that
Observe also that, for k = 1; 2,
Thus the quantities q k (1 + )i k ; k = 1; 2 are strictly positive. Now the conditions on the bids b k that
can be rewritten as
By assumption, the long term debt c cannot exceed the bound E. Thus the inequality above will hold if
Theorem 4 If the ratio E=m is su¢ ciently small, then there is a stationary equilibrium such that, in every period, each …rm of type k inputs i k , produces 
Proof. The bids a and b k ; k = 1; 2 satisfy their Euler equations, and the appropriate transversality condition is trivial because, by stationarity, the payo¤s are the same in every period.
Recall that Theorem 2 of Section 2.2.1 shows there is convergence to stationary equilibrium for the open model there. We suspect that an analogous result holds for the closed model of this section. Even if this is true, convergence may be slow and a general analytic solution to the model with innovation seems unlikely. Some simple examples for which convergence is fast are in Section 6.3 below.
The modeling of central bank pro…ts
In the model of Section 6.2.1, it is assumed that the amount c of long-term interest is part of the accounting pro…t D n (de…ned in (21)) of the central bank and is paid in each period to the consumer-owner agents (see (22)). This is one of several fairly natural models each with di¤erent …nancial, economic and political implications. One possibility is to neutralize the money as it comes in, leaving a de ‡ationary trend in place. Other alternatives are for the bank to subsidize some group of agents with this income, or spend it to buy resources (such as foreign aid subsidies for purchases in the economy, or the destruction of government purchases of resources for a foreign war). As many institutional variants can be de…ned, the choice among them depends on the questions to be answered and their empirical relevance.
In order to de…ne the minimal viable model we have collapsed …ve banking functions into a single institution. They are: A more detailed model would use at least three institutions: a central bank, commercial banks, and investment bankers. Here we have chosen a model with only three types of agents: the …rms, the consumer-owners, and a banking system. This seems to be the minimal number necessary to build a playable game that illustrates the phenomenon of breaking the circular ‡ow of capital.
Two simple examples
In this section equilibria are calculated for two very simple examples. In both examples the production functions f 1 and f 2 are de…ned by the equations (13) and (15); that is, they are assumed to be the same as those that were used for the example of Section 2.2.2. Similarly we assume that = = :05 as in that example and take = 1=1:05.
The …rst example treats a consumer-producer who labors in isolation to produce goods for his personal consumption and has the opportunity to innovate. The second example contrasts the …rst with the situation in a monetary economy with many …rms and owner-consumers.
Robinson Crusoe revisited
Consider …rst the situation of Robinson Crusoe equipped with the production function f 1 and without the opportunity to innovate. Suppose that Crusoe begins with a quantity of goods q > 0, selects an amount i; 0 i q to put into production, and consumes the remaining q i resulting in a utility of u(q i). He then begins the next period with goodsq = f 1 (i) and continues the game.
Let V 1 (q) be the value of this one-person game to Crusoe. It satis…es the Bellman equation
For simplicity we assume that Crusoe is risk neutral with utility function u(q) = q.
It is not di¢ cult to check that a stationary equilibrium has q = 2 and i = 1 at every stage of the game. Thus
Similarly, if Crusoe begins with the production function f 2 , a stationary equilibrium has q = 2 and i = 1=2 with value
Next assume that Crusoe begins with q = 2 and the production function f 1 , but has the opportunity to invest a portion of his goods in an attempt at innovation. Suppose further that the opportunity to innovate can be represented by a binary lottery ticket that can be obtained by utilizing j = 1=2 units of input material. The ticket is such that with probability 1=2 the innovation succeeds and Crusoe has the production function f 2 thereafter, but also with probability 1=2 it fails and Crusoe must continue with f 1 . Let V = V (2) be the value of this new game. Now Crusoe can reject the investment opportunity and continue with his original production function f 1 thereby earning V 1 (2) = 21, or make the investment and receive in expectation
The optimal choice for the input is again i = 1 and the quantity above equals
Since 25:5 > 21, it pays the non-monetary Crusoe to innovate. A smaller value for the discount factor , say = : 8, would go against innovation.
We now split Crusoe into two and place him in a monetary economy. The resource base per capita remains the same but, prior to innovation, Crusoe is in an economy that uses …at money but has no commercial bank and in a stationary equilibrium only implicitly needs the services of the central banks as no more money enters or leaves the economy. This changes with innovation.
A simple monetary economy
The following is an example of the model with many …rms and consumer owners that was presented abstractly in Section 6.2.
Let m = 1 be the amount of money held initially by the consumers, and suppose that the …rms begin with goods q = 2 and the production function f 1 . Assume …rst that the …rms do not attempt to innovate. The optimal input for the …rms is 1 unit of goods. Thus, if the price of goods is p, the …rms borrow and then bid b = p thereby obtaining i = b=p = 1 as input in order to produceq = f 1 (1) = 2 for the next period. The (short-term) loan to the …rms is …nanced by the deposit of m a = b of the owner-consumers. So the owners bid a = m b = m p and
The economy is in stationary equilibrium and each period the …rms earn the pro…t
with a total discounted return of
The consumers, like Crusoe in the previous example, are assumed to be risk neutral with utility function u(q) = q. In each period they receive in utility u(a=p) = u(1) = 1 with a total discounted utility of
Now suppose that the …rms have the opportunity to innovate. The physical aspects of the economy will be the same as for Crusoe in the previous example, but prices and money will now play a role.
By investing 1/2 unit of goods, each …rm can, independently of the others, purchase a lottery that with probability 1/2 results in the improved production function f 2 for the …rm, but also with probability 1/2 fails causing the …rm to continue with f 1 . The question for the managers of the …rms is whether they can improve upon the return achievable without making the attempt at innovation.
To answer this question, assume that the …rms do purchase the lottery. Suppose that the price of goods in the …rst period is p. The …rms will need to bid b + c = p + p=2 = 1:5p in order to purchase 1 unit of goods as input for production and 1/2 unit for the innovation attempt. The short-term loan of b = p is again …nanced by the consumer-owners who bid a and deposit m a = b = p as before. However, the bid c = p=2 is …nanced by a long-term bank loan which must be repaid over the in…nite future in payments of c in every period. The price of goods in the …rst period is then
So the price is p = 2=3, and b = 2=3; a = 1 p = 1=3 = c. The …rms earn in the …rst period the pro…t The owner-consumers receive in the …rst period
In all subsequent periods the unsuccessful …rms called type 1 with production function f 1 bid b 1 = p in order to input 1 unit of goods while the successful …rms called type 2 with production function f 2 bid b 2 = p=2 in order to input 1=2. As before these short-term loans are …nanced by the owner-consumers, who now hold cash m + c = 1 + 1=3 = 4=3. So they deposit
Hence, the price in periods after the …rst satis…es
that is, the price equals 2/3 in every period. (One should not expect constant prices in general. This example was constructed to make for a simple analysis.) Notice that because of the constant price and the constant derivative u 0 = 1, the Euler equation (24) is satis…ed at every stage. In periods after the …rst the type 1 …rms have the pro…t and owner-consumers receive
The total expected value to a …rm is Since 16:4507 > 9:975, the innovation lottery is good for the …rms. The total expected utility for an owner-consumer is
which is greater than 21. So the lottery is good for consumers also.
Innovation …nanced by a money market
In the economy of Section 6.2.1 as in the example of Section 6.3.2, the attempt at innovation is …nanced by the bank with an an injection of additional money into the system. It is also possible to construct examples for which innovation is …nanced by a money market with loans made to the …rms from the consumer-owners and the quantity of money remains …xed. We suspect that there are also examples where there is an equilibrium with innovation when there are additional funds available from a bank and that innovation will not occur without such additional funds.
6.4 A comment on monied individuals: Retirees or active capitalists?
In Section 5.1 we considered a model with a class of individuals whose only asset was government money. Because the solution supported the …at as both a means of payment and a store of value these individuals were able to live o¤ their money. In the model of Section 6.2, our main concern being central bank …nancing, we omitted them for simplicity. The introduction of a class of agents living o¤ money provides for a basic reconsideration of the role of …nance in the economy. In particular their interest in in ‡uencing a government set rate of interest may be diametrically opposed to the desires of the producers.
Is a retired surgeon with $10,000,000 the economic equivalent of a professional money lender with $10,000,000? Almost always the answer is no. Information, evaluation, expertise, and specialization of the …nancial functions are in essence an evolutionary aspect of the overall body economic. The essential di¤erence between a merely rich amateur investor and a professional is perception, expertise, knowledge and a network of professional connections. The professional investor is part of the general sensory system of the economy dealing in the perception and evaluation of risk in a dynamic economy. The rich retiree is better o¤ investing indirectly though a professional investor be it a bank, investment bank, or other …nancial professional unless she has a network of connections of her own that enable her to invest directly in a family's or friend's business.
The remarks above imply that at least we should split the savers in the model of Section 5.1 into two parts, passive savers and active …nanciers. The savers deposit only in the commercial banks or pension funds, while the …nanciers are involved in evaluation and deal directly with the …rms and the markets for …rms and their stocks. The consideration of such a model is left for a future project.
Ongoing Innovation Opportunities
In this, Part 2 of our consideration of the …nancing of innovation, we con…ned our observations to models with randomness only at the initial stage. In essence we were able to utilize a modi…cation of two dynamic programming models with independent agents each facing only one stochastic element at the start. Even with the piling up of gross simpli…cations the conditions needed to be able to obtain a stationary state involved an adjustment period of arbitrarily length. With a random variable each period the turbulence will increase considerably and the characterization of even the simplest market with innovation with a random element in each period will lead to a path dependent distribution of …rm size and stochastically increasing returns of the variety indicated by Brian Arthur [1] . We intend to pursue the possibility of an ongoing innovation process in a separate essay.
Summary Remarks
Our basic goal was to produce an adequate mathematical model that could re ‡ect mathematically the meaning of Schumpeter's breaking of the circular ‡ow of capital in a closed economy. There are several other basic features that static or even dynamic conventional equilibrium models cannot capture:
1. Innovation and comparative statics: Innovation requires an extra process that utilizes existing resources. This is illustrated here by a comparative analysis of two economies, one with and the other without innovation in Sections 6 and 5, respectively.
Robinson
Crusoe and the parallel worlds of goods and …nance: An understanding of Robinson Crusoe's innovation opportunities provides a clear preliminary way to understand the roles of real resources and ownership control prior to seeing the strategic decoupling o¤ered by money and the …nancial system in a complex economy [9] .
3. The problem of convergence to stationary equilibrium even with only one random event: Under reasonable assumptions the open economy of Section 2 converges to stationary equilibrium after an initial shock due to innovation. It remains open whether the same is true for the closed economy of Section 6. If so, the rate of convergence will no doubt depend on the speci…c structures of production and consumption.
4. Financing and two way causality: The availability of extra goods may bring forth a demand for extra money; however the …nancing of innovation may be generated by the availability of extra money or credit. Thus causality may go in both directions.
5. Bankruptcy as the delimiter of risk: Bankruptcy laws are a logical necessity needed to account for the possibility of failure. If innovation fails and individuals are bankrupted their remaining resources may be redistributed to cover in part the contractual obligations. Thus from the viewpoint of society as a whole the bankruptcy laws are a public good delineating how much the economy as a whole shares in the outcome from the individual gamble.
By selecting a bankruptcy penalty greater than or equal to the highest marginal utility of money on an equilibrium path and limiting the amounts that individuals borrow, we can avoid in our models solutions involving active bankruptcy.
6. The locus of innovation …nance may be public or private: Historically both private and public resources have been involved in innovation. Global exploration and then space exploration were heavily government enterprises to start with and the private sector followed. This is also true for the internet.
This paper was basically aimed at understanding the nature of the cash ‡ows in innovation. As such we purposely played down the distribution of power and wealth masking it by extreme aggregation.These factors require a separate treatment.
9 Appendix: The Proof of Theorem 2
Here the notation and assumptions are those of Section 2, and, in particular, Section 2.2.1. Consider an economy as in that section with two types of …rm at the beginning of a period in which every type 1 …rm holds the quantity of goods q 1 and every type 2 …rm holds the quantity q 2 with the total quantity of goods being Q = "q 1 + "q 2 .
By equation (3) where i k = b k =p; k = 1; 2 andQ is the total quantity of goods at the beginning of the next period. Moreover,
is the quantity of goods held by …rms of type k at the beginning of the next period. It follows from our assumptions on f 1 and f 2 that, for every positive value of i 1 there is a unique positive value of i 2 such that f Thus we can de…ne the mapping from the current value for the total quantity of goods Q to the quantityQ for the next period by (Q) = "f 1 (i 1 (Q)) + "f 2 (i 2 (Q)) =Q:
The mapping provides a law of motion for the economy when …rms choose their bids in agreement with the Euler equations. To complete the proof of Theorem 2, suppose that the …rms always make bids in agreement with the Euler equations. Let Q n be the total quantity of goods in period n. Then by part 4 of the lemma, Q n = n 1 (Q 1 ) ! Q . Also, if p n is the price in period n, then p n = (Q n ) ! (Q ) = p , because is continuous by assumption. Now let b k;n be the bid of …rms of type k in period n. Then
So b k;n ! b k , and the proof is complete.
